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French Land, Algerian People  
Nineteenth-Century French Discourse on Algeria and Its Consequences 
Paige N. Gulley 
 
 “Algeria, it is often said, is less a colony than the extension, across the Mediterranean, of 
France herself.”1 This is an extraordinary statement by the General Government of Algeria in 
1922. As early as 1913, historian Charles Emmerson notes, “a Frenchman would remind anyone 
who cared to listen [that] the southern extremity of the French Republic – that area legally 
considered the unitary territory of France, whole and indivisible – did not lie on the shores of the 
Mediterranean, but in Algeria, at the southern edge of the three French administrative 
départements…” Emmerson emphasizes, “It was only beyond them, amongst the undulating 
dunes of the Sahara, that the French Republic ended and the colonial French Empire began.” 2 
Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century, Algeria had come to hold such a privileged 
place for the French that it was not a mere colony, but a part of France across the Mediterranean. 
This view, however, did not extend to the people of Algeria, as Emmerson highlights: “Although 
all the Algerian and French-born residents of Algeria, both European and non-European, were 
considered French subjects, most non-Europeans (Arab, Kabyle and Berber) were not considered 
full citizens.” 3 This clearly indicates that Algeria and its people were viewed differently by the 
French. The distinction between the land and the people was created primarily through discourse, 
and became part of the French cultural imaginary. Indeed, this discursive difference – between 
Algeria, the valuable and useful land, and the people of Algeria,4 lazy, savage, and worthless – 
not only formed an integral part of the French understanding of Algeria but also influenced 
government policies on the colony throughout the nineteenth century. The French privileged the 
physical space of Algeria even as they devalued its people.  
The significance of discourse and knowledge production have been extensively studied in 
the second half of the twentieth century, most notably by Michel Foucault, who introduced the 
concept of power-knowledge as mutually constitutive and clearly connected the production of 
knowledge with the creation of power.5 The use of specific language in describing the world, 
especially other peoples and cultures, is integral in the creation of knowledge about (and thus 
                                                 
1 Gouvernement Général d’Algérie : Direction de l’agriculture, du commerce et de la colonisation [General 
Government of Algeria: Director of Agriculture, Commerce and Colonization], La Colonisation en Algérie : 1830-
1921 [Colonization in Algeria: 1830-1921] (Algiers: Imprimerie administrative Émile Pfister, 1922), PDF,  
Bibliothèque Nationale de France [National Library of France] (ark:/12148/bpt6k147325k), 3, my translation. 
2 Charles Emmerson, 1913: In Search of the World before the Great War (New York: Public Affairs, 2014), 267. 
3 Emmerson, 1913, 267. 
4 I use the phrase “people of Algeria” throughout this paper to avoid using offensive terms such as “native,” which 
can in colonial contexts carry a connotation of inferiority, and the French “indigène” (literally, “indigenous”), 
which, though quite common throughout the nineteenth century, is today a highly offensive term. I use the term 
“indigène” only in direct quotes from original sources due to its lack of a direct English translation. I do not use the 
term “Algerian” in order to avoid confusion between the people of Algeria and the French and European settlers 
who referred to themselves as “Algerian” beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century (see p. 28-29 of this 
paper). 
5 See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), esp. 29-30. 
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power over) them. In a colonial context, Edward Said focused on the relationship between 
authors, their texts, and orientalist ideas, and highlighted that the language used to describe the 
world is essential in creating perceptions of that world, for both the author and the reader.  
Language both reflects and creates the ideas it expresses. It is not merely a tool to be 
picked up and put down as needed; on the contrary, language is fundamental in human 
experience and comprehension of the world. As expressed by Friedrich Schleiermacher, the 
hermeneutic philosopher, “the innate nature of language modifies our mind.”6 Language can thus 
influence one’s understanding of the world: “language guides our perception intrinsically.”7 
Using language is an act of interpretation. In fact, “the world is given to us already interpreted 
through language.”8 Therefore, words do not simply describe human experience; they contribute 
to perceptions of the world. In the same way that power and knowledge are mutually 
constitutive, so too are language and ideas. As Pierre Bourdieu argued, language carries 
symbolic power: the “power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see 
and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the 
world.”9 Thus, word choice intrinsically influences the perception of the subject of discourse and 
actions toward that subject, making a study of the language used by the French essential to 
understanding their perceptions of and policies on Algeria. 
 Discussions of the colonizer’s view of a colony would be incomplete if they failed to 
recognize orientalism, Said’s theory of the relationship between the “Occident” and the “Orient” 
and the ways that the colonizer (the West) viewed the colonized (the East). It is the notion that 
“[t]here are Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; the latter must be 
dominated.”10 Said argues that the “Orient” is almost entirely an invention of the Occident, its 
own expectations and interpretations of the “other.” The creation of orientalist ideas is in large 
part the result of discourse and the use of specific language. As a reviewer notes, Said 
“underlines…the relation of the author to his material…[and] the relation between texts and the 
creation of a mode of discourse about the Orient.”11 Because people wrote about the non-
Western world in this manner, the oriental image came to define colonial relationships. Much of 
orientalism and its various applications focuses specifically on culture and people, and indeed, 
the French view of the people of Algeria was primarily an orientalist understanding.  
Said briefly introduces geography into his discussion of orientalism: “as both 
geographical and cultural entities...such locales, regions, geographical sectors as 'Orient' and 
'Occident' are man-made.”12 However, it becomes clear in reading further that Said is speaking 
primarily of culture; geography is merely an indication of a different culture. The “Orient,” 
                                                 
6 Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher, quoted in the introduction to The Hermeneutics Reader, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer 
(New York: Continuum, 1997), 11. 
7 Jens Zimmermann, Hermeneutics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 15. 
8 Zimmerman, Hermeneutics, 15. 
9 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew 
Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 170. 
10 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 36. 
11 Sophie Fenouillet, "Edward Said, L'orientalisme. L'Orient créé par l'Occident" ["Edward Said, Orientalism. The 
Orient Created by the Occident"], Mots [Words] 30, no. 1 (1992): 118, my translation, 
http://www.persee.fr/doc/mots_0243-6450_1992_num_30_1_1691. 
12 Said, Orientalism, 5, my emphasis. 
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though sometimes conceived as a physical place, signifies “oriental” peoples, and in this sense, 
can be understood more as a space than a place. As such, it is overwhelmingly on culture that 
orientalism, and its resulting studies, concentrate. Few studies have been done of the French 
metropole’s understanding of the land of its colonies, the physical space that is Algeria, as 
distinct from and even in opposition to its people. This paper will work to fill this gap and 
examine in detail the significance of the discursive distinction between Algeria and its people 
and its effects on French policies. 
 The issue of language in Algeria, both during the colonial period and in the post-colonial 
era, is one that has been addressed by many researchers.13 Scholars including Farid Aitsiselmi 
and Mohamed Benrabah have examined the importance of the French language in the education 
system of French Algeria, while Abdelmajid Hannoum has focused specifically on the creation 
of French knowledge about Algeria through the records of the Arab Bureaus.14 Aitsiselmi and 
Patricia Lorcin provide valuable studies of French terms for the people of Algeria and the 
creation of distinctions between “Arabs” and “Kabyles.”15 Other scholars, including David 
Prochaska, have studied European settlers’ use of language in the creation of an “Algerian” 
identity.16 However, while these and other researchers have studied in great detail the people of 
Algeria and the French policies and relations toward them, there are no detailed examinations of 
the discourse on the Algerian land as distinct from, and more valuable than, its people, nor the 
effects of this policy on the eventual French understanding of Algeria as part of France. 
 In studying French colonization, most scholars define the French colonial policy of the 
nineteenth century as one of “assimilation,” which is contrasted with “association” in the 
twentieth century.17 Benrabah defines “assimilation” as “Frenchification,” asserting that the 
French goal was to make the people of Algeria more “French,” and thus more “civilized.”18 
However, other scholars have suggested that “assimilation” was not so easily defined, and 
indeed, government documents from the colonial era demonstrate clearly that the situation in 
Algeria was more complicated than an “assimilation-to-association” model suggests. In a 
detailed study of the history of “assimilation,” Martin Deming Lewis argues that assimilation 
                                                 
13 See for example: Jonathan K. Gosnell, The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria, 1930-1954 (Rochester, 
NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002); Jean-Benoît Naveau and Julie Barlow, The Story of French (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2006); and Habiba Deming, “Language and Politics: A New Revisionism,” in Algeria & France, 
1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia, ed. Patricia Lorcin (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006): 181-
195. 
14 Farid Aitsiselmi, “Language Planning in Algeria: Linguistic and Cultural Conflicts”, in French in and out of 
France: Language Policies, Intercultural Antagonisms, and Dialogue, ed. Kamal Salhi, vol. 18 of Modern French 
Identities (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2002); Mohamed Benrabah, Language Conflict in Algeria: From Colonialism to 
Post-Independence (Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2013); Abdelmajid Hannoum, “Colonialism and Knowledge in 
Algeria,” History and Anthropology 12, no. 4 (2001): 343-379; and Abdelmajid Hannoum, “The Historiographic 
State: How Algeria Once Became French,” History and Anthropology 19, no. 2 (2008): 91-114. 
15 Aitsiselmi, “Language Planning in Algeria,” and Patricia M.E. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, prejudice 
and race in colonial Algeria (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), esp. 41-49, 120-130. 
16 This issue of “Algerian” identity will be taken up later in this paper; see esp. p. 28-29, also p. 48-51. David 
Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 215. 
17 One notable work which makes this distinction is Benrabah, Language Conflict in Algeria; see also Robert 
Aldrich, “Colonialism and Nation-Building in Modern France,” in Nationalizing Empires, eds. Stefan Berger and 
Alexei Miller (Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press, 2015), esp. 156. 
18 Benrabah, Language Conflict in Algeria, 25-26. 
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was much more nuanced than many scholars realize, incorporating policies toward both people 
and land.19 His work is one of the few that takes up the issue of land, providing important 
insights into the history of French policies of colonial land, though he fails to examine the 
question of the land versus the people of a colony, as well as neglecting to address in detail the 
uniqueness of the Algerian situation. 
 Lewis argues that the roots of the assimilation policy can be traced to the French 
Revolution (1789-1799), when the government “declared the colonies to be ‘integral parts of the 
Republic’, and divided them into départements just as in the mother country.”20 This initial 
assimilation of French colonies lasted for only four years, until Napoléon came to power. 
However, Lewis contends that it was this revolutionary practice that inspired calls for 
assimilation during the nineteenth century. In 1848, the French government “freed the slaves in 
the French West Indies, reestablished universal suffrage in the colonies as well as at home, and 
reinstituted colonial representation in the metropolitan parliament…Algeria, still not completely 
conquered, was divided into départements and given a civil regime with parliamentary 
representation at Paris, though there the suffrage was limited to the French settlers.”21 These 
reforms were also short-lived; only the abolition of slavery and the establishment of Algerian 
départements survived Napoléon III’s coup d’état in 1852. 22   
Following the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870, Lewis examines the increase 
in calls for the assimilation of French colonies. At this point, the majority of such arguments 
focused on the people of the colonies and attempts to “Frenchify” them.23 Though Lewis notes 
that calls for assimilation were usually broadly extended to all French colonies, he also 
acknowledges that “Algeria was recognized as a special case. The [national colonial] congress 
declared that it was une terre française [a French land], not a colony...”24 As such, Lewis’ work 
demonstrates that even within the French movement that favored assimilation for all French 
colonies, Algeria held a privileged position. Though the roots of the assimilationist movement 
were in the Revolution-era recognition of colonies as “parts of the Republic,” even the 
assimilationists of the national colonial congress considered Algeria to be more than a colony, 
and thus deserving of different policies. Algeria was the only colony designated as “French 
land,” despite calls for assimilationist policies in other French colonies. So what made Algeria 
different? Why did even those who traced their beliefs back to the inclusion of colonies as “parts 
of the Republic” differentiate Algeria from all other French colonies? And how did Algeria come 
to be understood as “the extension, across the Mediterranean, of France herself”?25 
In answering these questions, this paper will examine French government documents, as 
well as the memoirs of soldiers and politicians who visited Algeria during the nineteenth century. 
Based on these sources, it will argue that the French privileged above all the Algerian land. The 
                                                 
19 Martin Deming Lewis, “One Hundred Million Frenchmen: The "Assimilation" Theory in French Colonial Policy,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 4, no. 2 (Jan. 1962), 129-153, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.chapman.edu/stable/177745. 
20 Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen," 134. 
21 Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen," 135. 
22 In Algeria, the abolition of slavery was a more complex issue – see p. 16-18 of this paper. 
23 Lewis, “One Hundred Million Frenchmen,” 138. 
24 Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen," 145. 
25 Gouvernement Général d’Algérie, La Colonisation en Algérie, 3, my translation. 
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people of Algeria were variously ignored or valued merely as laborers who could work the soil. 
The governmental discourse of the value of the land also brought it into conflict with the settler 
population of Algeria, which played a significant role in the colony beginning in the late 
nineteenth century. The understanding of the worth of the Algerian land was the foundation for 
French government policies on the colony throughout the nineteenth century, which often 
demonstrated a lack of unity among French officials and ignored the views and experiences of 
French settlers and officials in the colony. These policies and the views created by this discourse 
would ultimately play a role in the struggle for Algerian independence a century later. 
 
Initial Experiences: The French Military 
The French entered Algeria in July 1830, defeating and driving out the ruling Ottoman 
Turks.26 This exodus of the Turks led Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1837, to compare the invasion of 
Algeria to a hypothetical Chinese invasion of France: “Suppose for a moment, Monsieur, that the 
Emperor of China, debarking in France at the head of a powerful army, made himself ruler of our 
major cities and our capital. And that after having destroyed all the public records without even 
taking the time to read them…he seized all the officials…; and deported them all at once to some 
distant country.”27 Tocqueville asserted that this was exactly what the French did in Algeria, and 
that as such, it would be very difficult for the conqueror to govern the defeated territory due to 
the linguistic barrier and the lack of understanding of the country’s government.28 In the case of 
Algeria, the government had been that of the Turks for 300 years prior to the French conquest, 
and thus it would be even more difficult to understand the culture and customs of the remaining 
population. Tocqueville used this comparison to suggest that the French alter their policies in 
Algeria; however, his analogy, made just seven years after the initial conquest, also highlighted 
the fact that the French were obligated to create their own policies and ideas about Algeria, due 
to their failure to engage with or attempt to understand the people of Algeria. This lack of 
interest in the people of Algeria from the beginning of French rule would continue throughout 
the colonial period, allowing the French to see the colony itself as part of France even as it 
ignored and marginalized the people of Algeria. 
After the initial conquest, Algeria was left under the control of “largely autonomous 
generals, who waged brutal warfare against the local Arab and Berber populations.”29 The 
fighting was not entirely one-sided, however; the people of Algeria mounted resistance to the 
French conquest, most notably the jihad led by Abd el-Kader from 1832 to his surrender in 
                                                 
26 Benrabah, Language Conflict in Algeria, 24. 
27 Alexis de Tocqueville, "Deuxième lettre sur l'Algérie (1837)" ["Second Letter on Algeria (1837)"], PDF, 
Université du Québec à Chicoutimi : Les classiques des sciences sociales [University of Quebec at Chicoutimi: The 
Classics of Social Science], last modified October 10, 2013, 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/De_tocqueville_alexis/de_la_colonie_algerie/lettre_sur_algerie/lettre_sur_algeri
e.pdf, my translation. 
28 Tocqueville, "Deuxième lettre sur l'Algérie (1837)." 
29 Stacey Renee Davis, "Turning French Convicts into Colonists: The Second Empire's Prisoners in Algeria, 1852-
1858," French Colonial History 2, Colonial French Encounters: New World, Africa, Indochina (2002): 95, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.chapman.edu/stable/41938124. 
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1847.30 Abd el-Kader controlled large areas of land in eastern Algeria and called upon the people 
of Algeria living in French-controlled territories to immigrate to the east, even obtaining fatwas31 
allowing him to attack those who refused.32 However, French persistence and brutality weakened 
his forces, leading him to surrender in 1847.33 Though Abd el-Kader’s struggle is often used to 
symbolize all resistance to French rule in Algeria, soldiers also faced attacks from various other 
groups.34 Throughout the 1830s and early 1840s, one third of France’s army served in Algeria.35 
During the conquest, an estimated 1.6 million people of Algeria and over 100,000 French 
soldiers were killed.36  
It was not until 1841, more than ten years after the initial takeover, that the French 
government officially annexed Algeria, making it a French territory.37 Even after the annexation 
and the defeat of Abd el-Kader, the French government continued to leave Algeria under military 
control. Until the 1880s, the governor general of Algeria was a military officer, and the majority 
of the colony was ruled by Arab Bureaus, whose military members had experience in the areas 
they controlled, and whose archives were largely responsible for creating French impressions 
and understandings of Algeria throughout the nineteenth century.38 As such, soldiers’ 
experiences in Algeria represented the majority of the French presence in the initial few decades 
of colonial rule. 
In order to successfully take control of the colony, the French army needed interpreters to 
communicate with the people of Algeria, and this group provides important insights into the 
official policy towards the people of Algeria in the 1830s. Just after the initial conquest, one 
interpreter was tasked with delivering a “Proclamation to the Arabs,” in which he explained the 
intentions of the French and their hope that the people of Algeria would obey the French 
conquerors. At the end of this proclamation, he warned the people of Algeria that God “inflicts 
the most rigorous punishments on those who commit damage against the land and who ruin the 
                                                 
30 Abd el-Kader is also commonly spelled Abdelkader, Abd-el-kader, Abd el Kader, 'Abd Al-Qâdir, Abdul-Qadir, 
Abdul Kader. For a discussion of his struggle against the French, see Benjamin Claude Brower, "The Amîr ʿAbd Al-
Qâdir and the 'Good War' in Algeria, 1832-1847," Studia Islamica [Islamic Studies] 106, no. 2 (2011), 169-195, 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.chapman.edu/stable/23884954. It is from Brower that I borrow the classification of 
Abd el-Kader’s struggle against the French as a jihad. 
31 "A fatwā is an Islamic legal pronouncement, issued by an expert in religious law (mufti), pertaining to a specific 
issue, usually at the request of an individual or judge to resolve an issue where Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), is 
unclear." However, in recent years, "the term “fatwā” has been widely used...to indicate that a death sentence has 
been dealt to someone or some group of people." Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, "What is a Fatwa?" The 
Islamic Supreme Council of America, accessed June 19, 2018. 
http://www.islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/44-what-is-a-fatwa.html. Brower, from 
whom this information is taken, appears to be using fatwa in its original sense. However, in this context, the term 
functionally implies both meanings. 
32 Brower, “The Amîr ʿAbd Al-Qâdir,” 179. 
33 Marcel Emerit and Amy Tikkanen, “Abdelkader,” Encyclopædia Britannica, last modified August 14, 2008, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdelkader#ref97. 
34 Brower, “The Amîr ʿAbd Al-Qâdir,” 175. 
35 L. Carl Brown et. al., “Algeria: History – French Algeria,” Encyclopædia Britannica, last modified December 18, 
2017, https://www.britannica.com/place/Algeria/Cultural-life#ref46532. 
36 Brower, “The Amîr ʿAbd Al-Qâdir,” 177. 
37 Abdelmajid Hannoum, "Colonialism and Knowledge in Algeria: The Archives of the Arab Bureau," History and 
Anthropology 12, no. 4 (2001): 344. 
38 Brown, “Algeria,” and Hannoum, “Colonialism and Knowledge in Algeria,” 343. 
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country and its inhabitants.”39 Significantly, this statement emphasized above all harm to the 
land and the country, listing the inhabitants last, almost as an afterthought. In other words, it 
depicted the well-being of the country and the land itself as the primary concerns of the French. 
In fact, the physical soil was mentioned twice, as “land” and “country,” whereas the people 
appeared only once. Thus, even in the 1830s, the French were creating a discursive distinction 
between the land and the people of Algeria. The fact that they did not prohibit damage to the 
people suggests that the French considered the Algerians already to be “damaged,” or at least 
inferior, and that it was only their ruin – which it is impossible to recover from – that concerned 
the conquerors.40 The land, however, had to be protected from both damage and ruin. Thus, from 
the very beginning of the conquest, the French in Algeria began to construct a discursive 
distinction between the land and its people which privileged the value of the soil. 
In addition to the interpreters, many French soldiers were stationed in Algeria, especially 
from 1830 to 1860. Some of these soldiers, like Colonel C. Trumelet, published memoirs about 
their experiences in the colony. In his work, Trumelet detailed his life in Algeria over several 
decades, as well as the history of the town of Boufarik, which served as the base for Trumelet 
and his soldiers. His book depicted a very different Algeria than the agricultural paradise many 
others saw. Trumelet described a challenging country and people, neither of which would easily 
submit to French rule. He referred to a “struggle with the people, with the soil, with the 
elements.”41 Unlike most other sources, Trumelet depicted the people and the land as equally 
dangerous to the French, who were engaged in a “struggle” on both fronts.  
As a soldier, Trumelet’s main responsibility was the conquest, placing him at war with 
various local groups. His relationship with the people of Algeria was rather complicated; it is 
clear that he saw them as not merely ignorant but also dangerous. He was willing to use them to 
his advantage if possible, describing a local leader as a “loyal and devoted servant who believed 
in us…”42 Although Trumelet was allied with at least some of the people of Algeria, the majority 
of them remained his enemy. He was willing to negotiate when possible, to avoid conflict, but 
when the people of Algeria were not willing to talk, Trumelet was brutal in his attacks. 
Describing a fight with one dissident group, Trumelet recounted how “we did not destroy as 
many [of them] as we had wanted to.”43 Trumelet's regret in this instance was that he had failed 
to kill many of this group, not that he had failed to form an alliance with them, and thus avoid 
any killing at all. He was willing to make agreements if possible, for the instrumental purpose of 
not being at war with everyone; however, Trumelet took pleasure in killing the people of 
Algeria, and even wished that he could have killed more. To him, the people of Algeria were 
merely an obstacle that prevented the French from creating a life in the colony.  
In addition to the war, Trumelet and his men were faced with the difficulties of Algeria 
itself. He suggested overtly that the country was fatal: “the land…will kill [the inhabitants of 
                                                 
39 L. Charles Féraud, Les Interprètes de l'Armée de l'Afrique : Archives du corps [The Interpreters of the Army of 
Africa: Corps Archives] (Algiers: A, Jourdan, Libraire, 1876), PDF, 168, my translation. 
40 The original French word, “mal,” can apply to people in a way that “damage” generally does not in English; in 
this instance, it could also be translated as “harm,” mental or physical. 
41 Colonel C. Trumelet, Bou-Farik (Algiers: Adolphe-Jourdan, 1887), PDF, xv, my translation. 
42 Trumelet, Bou-Farik, 48, my translation. 
43 Trumelet, Bou-Farik, 55, my translation. 
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Boufarik]” as part of “the war with the soil.”44 This included a severe drought in 1838, as well as 
less serious ones in subsequent years, which further inhibited agriculture for soldiers already 
unaccustomed to the Algerian climate.45 In fact, the land itself sometimes impeded the soldiers in 
their combat with the people of Algeria: “The difficulty of the terrain prevented our brave 
cavalry from driving the charge [against the people of Algeria] as far as we would have liked.”46 
Algeria itself was making Trumelet’s job as a soldier more difficult. Not only was he engaged in 
a war against the people of Algeria; he also had to contend with the challenges of the land and 
the climate. Thus, Trumelet’s experience of Algeria was that of an inhospitable, dangerous 
territory where one had to fight to survive. 
Trumelet’s struggles in Algeria were not limited to the war, whether with the soil or the 
people. He also documented the various maladies both settlers and soldiers suffered: “the new 
regiments above all pay a large tribute to the climate, to the insalubrity of the Metidja [sic], and 
to the miseries of the African war…they die there without glory, killed by fever, by dysentery 
and by nostalgia.”47 For Trumelet, Algeria was a deadly land that killed soldiers with its climate 
alone, condemning them to inglorious, painful deaths. In addition to the change in climate, 
Trumelet stated that his men also died from “nostalgia.” Significantly, this suggested that the 
foreignness of Algeria itself could be fatal, establishing it as clearly separate from France. In 
fact, the idea of fatal nostalgia was prominent in the early nineteenth century, as Thomas 
Dodman has noted. Dodman chronicles the history of the French nostalgie, which was until the 
late nineteenth century a technical medical term.48 One French intellectual of the mid-nineteenth 
century described “nostalgia to be deadlier than poverty.”49 As such, it was not unusual for a 
French commander like Trumelet to speak of his men dying of nostalgia in Algeria.  
This understanding of fatal nostalgia had an effect on the colonization of Algeria. While 
Dodman acknowledges that it is impossible to attribute increased governmental attempts at 
colonization solely to nostalgia, he asserts that by the late 1840s, the French had begun to 
recognize that what their soldiers and settlers were missing was the feeling of a French space 
more so than a geographical French place.50 As such, he asserts that increased settler 
colonization was in some ways influenced by nostalgia.51 Indeed, as early as 1839, French 
military physicians had proposed that one cure for nostalgic patients was to “make them forget 
                                                 
44 Trumelet, Bou-Farik, xiii, my translation. 
45 Trumelet, Bou-Farik, 167. 
46 Trumelet, Bou-Farik, 104, my translation. 
47 Trumelet, Bou-Farik, 130, my translation. 
48 Thomas Dodman, "Tropiques Nostalgiques: Fatal Homesickness in French Algeria,” Historical Reflections / 
Réflexions Historiques 39, no. 3: Nostalgia in Modern France: Bright New Ideas about a Melancholy Subject 
(Winter 2013), 86, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42703773. 
49 Achille Fillias, Histoire de la Conquête et de la colonisation de l'Algérie (1830-1860) [History of the Conquest 
and the Colonization of Algeria (1830-1860)] (Paris: Arnauld de Vresse, 1860), 348-34, quoted in Dodman, 
"Tropiques Nostalgiques," 88, his translation. 
50 For theoretical background on the difference between space and place and its connection to the construction of 
nationalism, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(New York: Verso, 1983). 
51 Dodman, “Tropiques Nostalgiques,” 87. 
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that they are in Africa.”52 This suggests creating a distinctly French society in Algeria, indicating 
that within a decade of the conquest, some Frenchmen already saw a need to make Algeria more 
than a simple colony by making it feel like France. Significantly, such recognition came almost 
exclusively from French soldiers with experience in the colony; most French politicians were not 
interested in Algeria until much later. Indeed, it would take several decades for mainland French 
officials to take a serious interest in colonization policies, and still longer until the French 
government officially recognized Algeria as part of France, not just a colony. However, the first 
articulation of Algeria’s ultimate place in the French imaginary came less than ten years after the 
conquest from within Algeria. Ironically, at that time, the idea of a French Algeria was in 
response to the perceived deadliness of nostalgia – that is, in response to the vast differences 
between Algeria and France. 
With the various struggles Trumelet and his men faced in Algeria, including the war with 
the people of Algeria, physical illnesses, environmental difficulties, and psychological maladies 
like nostalgie, Trumelet’s experience of the colony was that of hardship. He, as well as many 
other soldiers of his time, viewed Algeria as so different and so far removed from France that it 
was fatal. However, despite all his suffering, Trumelet still spoke several times of “our 
Algeria.”53 “Our” referred to the French, and thus Trumelet considered Algeria as French and 
supported efforts to master and populate the land with Frenchmen. Trumelet used “our” with the 
implication of possession – for him, Algeria belonged to France; it was not a part of France, 
demonstrating his a more traditional colonial view of Algeria as a French possession. Though he 
viewed both the land and the people as dangerous, Trumelet ultimately created a discursive 
distinction between them. The land, though hostile, could be dominated and possessed, and thus 
could be called “ours”; but the people could only, at most, be allies – or subjects – of the French. 
As such, Trumelet was willing to remain in Algeria and attempt to tame the land, despite its 
dangers; but the people of Algeria were to be killed, not negotiated with unless it was absolutely 
necessary. 
 
Slavery and Prisoners: The First Differences of Opinion between the French Government 
and Its Officials in Algeria 
The question of slavery in Algeria demonstrated that even within the first few decades of 
French presence in the colony, the French in Algeria recognized the value of the land and its 
potential while utterly rejecting the possible utility of the people of Algeria. Throughout the 
1840s, the issue of slavery in French colonies and possessions was a prominent one, ultimately 
resulting in the abolition of slavery in all French colonies in 1848.54 In the late 1840s and early 
1850s, Eugène Bodichon, a prominent French doctor who settled in Algiers, noted that “‘[d]eath 
                                                 
52 M. Gaudineau, "Mémoire présenté à Mr [sic] Bégin, Inspecteur du service de santé, sur la création d'un dépôt de 
convalescence en Algérie," ["Recollection presented to Mr. Bégin, Inspector of the Health Service, on the Creation 
of a Convalescent Home in Algeria"] 7 June 1843, 30, Archives Historiques du Service de Santé de l'Armée au Val 
de-Grâce [Historic Archives of the Health Service of the Army of Val-de-Grâce], Paris, carton 67, dossier 8, quoted 
in Dodman, “Tropiques Nostalgiques,” 90, his translation. 
53 Trumelet, Bou-Farik, xi, xiii, 404, my translation. The work also contains references to "our colony" and other 
similar expressions.  
54 See p. 6 of this paper. 
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comes quickly in Algeria’ for European settlers.”55 As such, as scholar Benjamin Claude Brower 
notes, Bodichon believed that “only indigenous settlers would take root in Algeria. He agreed 
that such colonists could be best found by diverting captives from the Saharan slave trade and 
directing them towards Algeria. Here they would be legally emancipated and put to work on the 
land.”56 Significantly, Bodichon argued that only Africans from outside of Algeria were suitable 
for this purpose; he and other Frenchmen in Algeria espoused “the ‘devotion’ of African slaves 
of color in contrast to Algeria's ‘belicose’ [sic] populations.”57 The people of Algeria, in this 
view, were not suitable for any work and could not provide any benefits to the colony. In order to 
cultivate the land, the French would need to import Africans from elsewhere to work the soil. 
This proposition not only demonstrated French hostility toward the people of Algeria; it also 
highlighted the incredible importance of the cultivation of Algeria. Bodichon believed that 
Algerian agriculture was so important that the French should import Africans from elsewhere to 
achieve it. He also recognized the same “insalubrity” of Algeria that Trumelet had noted, which 
officials in France failed to comment upon.58 Thus, Bodichon’s proposal illustrated the extent to 
which the French in Algeria valued the land and despised its people. 
The abolition of slavery in 1848 was one of the first clear indications of the split between 
French officials in France and those in Algeria. At the time of abolition, despite Bodichon’s 
suggestion, the majority of slaves in Algeria were held by the people of Algeria, not the 
Europeans living in the colony, making abolition something that the French would have to 
enforce against the people of Algeria. However, Brower asserts that “administrators in Algeria 
felt little enthusiasm for a measure [the abolition of slavery] far from their own interests and 
aspirations. Therefore they did what they had learned to do in such situations, they 
equivocated.”59 The governor-general of Algeria argued that in a colony that was still not 
entirely conquered, it would be impossible to enforce abolition. Nonetheless, in practice, his 
administration used abolition to their own ends. For those groups that were against the French, 
the colonial administration strictly enforced abolition. However, Brower emphasizes, to their 
allies among the people of Algeria, “French administers granted…permission to trade in slaves 
and keep those they owned, and in some cases, the French administration even returned fugitive 
slaves.”60 Thus, the French officials in Algeria used the law as a political tool to either reward or 
punish the people of Algeria. This selective enforcement of the law demonstrates that as early as 
the 1840s, French officials in the metropole lacked an understanding of the experiences of the 
French in Algeria, a problem that would continue throughout the nineteenth century. 
More than two decades passed after the conquest before the French government began 
seriously entertaining the idea of colonizing Algeria with French settlers. In 1852, Napoléon III's 
administration transported to Algeria a group of political prisoners who had been condemned for 
                                                 
55 Eugène Bodichon, Hygiène à suivre en Algérie, acclimatement des Européens. Hygiène morale [Hygiene to 
Follow in Algeria, Acclimatization of Europeans. Moral Hygiene] (Paris: Rey, Delavigne & Cie, 1851), quoted in 
Benjamin Claude Brower, "Rethinking Abolition in Algeria Slavery and the ‘Indigenous Question’ (Repenser 
l'abolition en Algérie: l'esclavage et ‘la question indigène’)," Cahiers d'Études Africaines [Journal of African 
Studies] 49, no. 195 (2009): 818, my translation, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.chapman.edu/stable/40380026. 
56 Brower, “Rethinking Abolition in Algerian Slavery,” 818. 
57 Brower, “Rethinking Abolition in Algerian Slavery,” 817. 
58 Trumelet, Bou-Farik, 130, my translation. 
59 Brower, “Rethinking Abolition in Algerian Slavery,” 808. 
60 Brower, “Rethinking Abolition in Algerian Slavery,” 809. 
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leading insurrections in response to Napoléon III’s coup d’état in 1851.61 The governor-general 
of Algeria, Jacques-Louis Randon, hoped that these 6,000 men would become permanent 
settlers, and attempted to institute programs that would allow them to build a life in Algeria as 
well as encourage them to ask their families to join them in the colony.62 However, the political 
needs of Napoléon III proved to be more important than the settlement of Algeria. By the middle 
of 1852, the emperor had begun issuing pardons to the political prisoners as a form of 
propaganda to increase his own popularity.63 In 1856, when Napoléon III pardoned the 
remaining 800 prisoners, fewer than 50 chose to settle in Algeria. The rest returned to France to 
resume their previous lives.64 
 The case of the prisoners demonstrated the lack of unity between the French government 
and its officials in Algeria. As historian Stacey Renee Davis notes, the government had yet to 
define its plans for the colony’s future: “Was Algeria a mere dumping ground for unwanted 
French citizens, or a potential agricultural powerhouse that needed the proper economic and 
demographic resources to flourish?”65 Napoléon III and his advisors treated Algeria like a French 
Australia, merely a convenient place to send subversives. By pardoning all the men, the emperor 
indicated that his own popularity mattered more to him than the settlement of Algeria. Randon, 
on the other hand, attempted to entice the prisoners to stay, preferring to view them as settlers; 
but with little support from the French government, as well as the prisoners’ understanding that 
they would eventually be pardoned and allowed to return home, he failed.66 While Randon could 
imagine, and indeed advocated for, a strong French presence in Algeria, the French metropole 
government continued to treat the colony as a “primarily military outpost…which existed to 
thwart the expansion of her European neighbors.”67 In fact, Davis observes, apart from its uses as 
a penal colony, Napoléon III “showed no interest whatsoever” in Algeria until the 1860s.68 
 The prisoner experiment also revealed an important distinction that the French 
government constantly made between Algeria and its people. Both Napoléon III’s and Randon’s 
visions of the colony completely did not take into account its native, non-French inhabitants. 
Randon had hoped that the prisoners would remain to cultivate Algeria, believing that the colony 
had enormous agricultural potential. However, in Randon’s mind, this potential could only be 
realized by French farmers. The “proper economic and demographic resources” that Algeria 
needed were primarily Frenchmen to colonize and cultivate the land.69 Similarly, Napoléon III’s 
use of Algeria as a penal colony disregarded the existence of the people of Algeria, 
acknowledging them only as a potential threat to the safety of the prisoners. Thus, even before 
the French government had clarified its intentions for Algeria, it operated under the assumption 
that only the land could have any value for France, whether as mere physical space or as 
                                                 
61 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 95-96. 
62 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 98-99, 107-108. 
63 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 101. 
64 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 109. 
65 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 94-95. 
66 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 109. 
67 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 94. 
68 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 110. 
69 Davis, “Turning French Convicts into Colonists,” 94-95. 
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potential farmland. The people of Algeria, on the other hand, were completely ignored or viewed 
only as a threat to the safety of the French.  
 
Not Useless: The People of Algeria as Agricultural Laborers, 1860s 
 In 1859, just a few years after the last convicts were pardoned and returned to France, the 
French Senate received one of the earliest calls for the creation of a concrete colonization policy, 
in the form of a petition from a Jesuit priest. Father Brumauld asserted in his petition that Algeria 
"could provide well-being to a large population, and also supplement the riches of France, 
through the abundance and excellence of its products of all types.”70 However, Brumauld 
believed that this potential value would remain unrealized due to the lack of French settlers in 
Algeria. Although he asserted that the “indigènes should be the principal element” in this 
endeavor, he also believed that they were “neither industrious enough, nor, above all, dependent 
enough on the conquerors” to make Algeria the valuable agricultural colony that it could be.71 As 
such, Brumauld presented Randon’s view of Algeria, which would become common in the 
French government: the Algerian land was a valuable resource that could be exploited by the 
French, but the people were ignorant and lazy, in need of assistance from and even domination 
by the more capable French. Brumauld’s petition was one of the earliest documents from within 
France to focus on the agricultural potential of Algeria, as well as to suggest the role of the 
people of Algeria in achieving this potential. Though he clearly privileged the value of the land, 
Brumauld also acknowledged that the people of Algeria could be utilized as laborers, unlike the 
soldiers and officials who saw them as merely a threat.  
Brumauld emphasized the potential value and utility of the land in order to argue for the 
necessity of an increased French settler population in Algeria. However, he acknowledged that 
“the good families of farmers, who would be more desirable, do not emigrate voluntarily.”72 
Indeed, the difficulty of enticing French citizens to emigrate to Algeria would be a recurring 
problem throughout French attempts at colonization. As such, Brumauld suggested that the 
Senate institute a program to send the “unfortunate youth” of France to colonize Algeria, as this 
would not only transport French farmers to Algeria but also “relieve France of an ever-onerous, 
and sometimes dangerous, population,” and provide the opportunity for “true physical and moral 
well-being” to that group.73 Thus, Brumauld argued, his plan would benefit the metropole, the 
colony, and even the youths themselves. This linkage of benefit to the metropole with that of the 
colony would become more pronounced in later colonization programs, forming an important 
aspect of official French efforts at colonization. 
It does not appear that the program suggested by Brumauld was ever put into action. 
However, his petition was one of the earliest documents of the French metropole government 
                                                 
70 Ferdinand Brumauld (Father), Pétition du P. Brumauld au Sénat en faveur de la colonisation de l'Algérie, et de la 
jeunesse malheureuse de France [Petition of Father Brumauld to the Senate in favor of the Colonization of Algeria, 
and of the Unfortunate Youth of France] (Paris: Imprimerie de Ch. Lahure et Cie., 1859): PDF, Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France (ark:/12148/bpt6k5808419w), 3, my translation. 
71 Brumaud, Pétition du P. Brumauld au Sénat, 4, my translation. 
72 Brumaud, Pétition du P. Brumauld au Sénat, 5, my translation. 
73 Brumaud, Pétition du P. Brumauld au Sénat, 8, my translation. 
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that emphasized the benefits of the colonization of Algeria, beyond mere military control. This 
was also one of the earliest instances of recognition by someone within France, not a colonial 
administrator like Randon, that Algeria could be a source of wealth rather than merely a drain on 
resources and a deterrent to the expansion of other European powers. As such, Brumauld’s 
petition was an early step toward France’s eventual recognition of Algeria as a part of France 
itself. By acknowledging that Algeria had the potential to be more than a military outpost, 
Brumauld suggested that it could be put to use for France’s profit, providing increased incentive 
for the government to both colonize Algeria and begin to recognize it as part of French territory. 
Significantly, in Brumauld’s case, this recognition came from within the French metropole, not 
from the colony. Brumauld’s and Randon’s visions of Algeria’s potential were very similar, 
though Brumauld’s came seven years later. However, neither was acted upon. This reflects both 
the French metropole government’s lack of interest in Algeria until the 1860s, and the 
differences between the perspectives of the French who lived in Algeria and those who remained 
in the metropole. This difference of opinion would continue throughout the colonial period, 
affecting both ideas and policies on Algeria. 
In 1860, the French government, led by Napoléon III, finally began taking a serious 
interest in Algeria. In September of that year, the emperor made a short trip to Algiers, during 
which he set the tone for the official discourse on the people of Algeria: "[E]levating the Arabs 
to the dignity of free men…improving their existence by taking from the land all the treasures 
that Providence buried there and that a bad government would leave barren, that is our 
mission.”74 In a classically orientalist manner, Napoléon III spoke of the people of Algeria as in 
need of "elevation” and incapable of using their resources effectively, suggesting that they were 
uneducated and perhaps even barbarous, and thus needed the French to “civilize” them. A key 
aspect of the “improvement” of the lives of the people of Algeria was the use of the land and its 
“treasures.” As such, Napoléon III privileged above all the value of the Algerian soil and its 
importance to the French colonial project. 
Napoléon III’s policies on Algeria reflected this understanding of the value of the land 
and the inferiority of the people. During the early 1860s, his government focused on attempting 
to tie the people of Algeria to their land. In an 1861 letter to Jean-Jacques Pélissier, the governor-
general of Algeria, Napoléon III defined the problem as "returning total security to Algeria, not 
only by our military occupation, but also, by attaching the Arabs to the land and by giving them 
property titles.”75 Clearly, there was a practical aspect to this project, namely that when the 
people of Algeria were attached to their land, they could be more easily controlled and surveilled 
than in nomadic groups. The issue of land was also (perhaps even primarily) one of agriculture. 
By granting property rights to the people of Algeria, the government would create a multitude of 
farms that could produce valuable crops for export to France. As such, the project of tying the 
people of Algeria to the land simultaneously allowed them to be used as laborers by the French 
and highlighted the importance of the soil.  
                                                 
74 Napoléon III, speech (Algiers, Algeria, 19 September 1860), quoted in Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le royaume 
arabe : La politique algérienne de Napoléon III, 1861-1870 [The Arab Kingdom: The Algerian Policies of Napoléon 
III, 1861-1870] (Office des Publications Universitaires, 2014), 59, my translation.  
75 Letter of the emperor [Napoléon III] to Marshall Pélissier, 1 November 1861, original housed in the Fonds 
Brunon [Brunon Collection], quoted in Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 152-153, my translation. 
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Around the same time, one of Napoléon III’s councilors suggested a model of 
colonization that would use the people of Algeria for both security and cultivation: “Militarily 
organized, these indigène settlers, while cultivating the soil, would not lose their warlike 
virtues.”76 This suggestion reinforced Napoléon III’s intention to use the people of Algeria for 
the defense of the colony because “Algeria had already cost [France] a lot.”77  The French did 
not want to lose more French soldiers defending Algeria; however, it was perfectly acceptable if 
a few of the people of Algeria were killed defending their land, because it was the land that was 
most important to the French.  Thus, French willingness to exploit the “warlike” character of the 
people of Algeria also further highlighted their relative lack of value, while emphasizing the 
importance of Algeria itself and the need to defend it. 
 Those who opposed Napoléon III’s plans for Algeria employed the same distinction 
between the land and the people to argue against trusting the people of Algeria. Napoléon III was 
remarkably arabophile for his time.78 Despite his orientalist view of the people of Algeria as less 
civilized than the French, his plans for the colony indicated a high level of trust in the people of 
Algeria, as well as a desire to help them. However, many of his own councilors, as well as 
various French political parties, opposed his ideas on Algeria, criticizing the emperor’s project 
for giving too much freedom to the people of Algeria and lacking French involvement. Critics 
worried that such a policy could backfire on the French: “Take care that the Arab frontier foot 
soldiers, charged with defending the western frontier of Algeria, don’t one day open the door to 
the English or the Moroccan partisans.”79 Fears that Napoléon III’s leniency could lead to 
renewed hostilities between the French and the people of Algeria constituted the majority of the 
criticism of the emperor’s plans. 
To prevent this possibility, officials suggested sending more Frenchmen to the colony to 
oversee the people of Algeria. Pélissier believed that Algeria was in need of a French presence 
beyond the plans of the emperor. His report to Napoléon III in 1861 stated that “the Arab needs 
to be the arm but he would not know how to be the head of colonization…we must continue to 
entice the European [to Algeria] by offering him land to acquire just as we must attach the Arab 
[to the land] by making him a proprietor.”80 Pélissier did not challenge the idea of tying the 
people of Algeria to the land and benefitting from their labor; rather, he objected to the lack of 
French people to lead the process. In fact, Pélissier believed that not only Frenchmen but 
Europeans in general were needed in Algeria, demonstrating an orientalist view of the people of 
Algeria as well as privileging the land of Algeria as an enticement for European settlers. As such, 
his suggestion underlined above all the value of the soil – the people of Algeria would be useful 
only if they were tied to the land, working it for the benefit of France (as the “arms” of 
colonization), and the territory itself would in turn attract more European settlers to Algeria (an 
idea that would influence later governmental attempts at colonization). Thus, even those who felt 
that Napoléon III would give the people of Algeria too much responsibility agreed that they 
                                                 
76 Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 129, my translation. 
77 Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 130, my translation. 
78 Rey-Goldzeiguer, Le Royaume Arabe, 59, 129-131. 
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my translation. 
80 Rapport de Pélissier à l'empereur [Report of Pélissier to the Emperor], 30 November 1861, quoted in Rey-
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needed to be tied to the land to benefit France, and thus recognized their value as agricultural 
laborers.81  
 The French policies concerning Algerian land during the 1860s followed the advice of 
Marshall Pélissier, attempting to take into account both the people of Algeria and potential 
European settlers. However, the ultimate goal was always the exploitation of the soil. In 1863, 
the Senate “recognize[d] the indigène tribes as proprietors of the territories that they occupied,” 
making them the legal owners of their land.82 Territory not owned by the people of Algeria was 
divided into lots and put up for sale.83 Anyone, Europeans or even “the indigènes themselves,” 
was eligible to purchase territory, for “the final goal [was] to promote the development of the 
land.”84 Thus, under Napoléon III’s government, influenced by his own arabophilia, the people 
of Algeria were not only allowed to purchase land but also granted property rights to their 
ancestral territories. However, this generosity still served the ultimate goal of putting the soil to 
use for the enrichment of France. 
 Though “the Government placed the highest of hopes” on the land sale system, it had 
little effect on either the cultivation or colonization of Algeria.85 Instead of turning the land into 
profitable farms, “the buyers, free from all obligation, neither lived [on] nor exploited [the land], 
hoping only to resell their land at a profit.”86 However, agriculture was not the only goal of the 
land sale policies. Officials like Pélissier had hoped that the sales would also bring more settlers 
from the metropole to Algeria, thus increasing colonization. However, of the 248 lots sold in 
1866, “more than half [were] acquired by indigènes. No buyer from the metropole presented 
himself.”87 In fact, in 1870, the new governor-general of Algeria stated that “‘the land sold to 
support colonization’ was bought by indigènes or resold to indigènes.”88 As such, the policy 
failed both to bring French settlers to Algeria and to increase the cultivation of the colony, for the 
majority of the French believed that the people of Algeria needed French guidance to make the 
land profitable for France.  
Calls for colonization were often, as in Pélissier’s report, calls for French instruction of 
the people of Algeria, who could be used to work the soil but needed the more knowledgeable 
French to direct their efforts. As such, the issue of the colonization of Algeria was inextricably 
tied to the use of the Algerian soil. The land sale policy of the 1860s was perhaps the clearest 
evidence of this connection: in selling the land, the government hoped to attract Frenchmen to 
Algeria, thereby bringing valuable European agricultural skills that could be taught to the people 
of Algeria, who would also be allowed to buy and work the soil. However, the failure of 
                                                 
81 Arguments like Pélissier’s, which in many ways echoed Brumauld’s, suggesting the necessity of bringing French 
settlers to Algeria to oversee the people of Algeria, teach them European cultivation methods, and use their labor 
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Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 70. 
82 Gouvernement Général d’Algérie, La Colonisation en Algérie, 21, my translation. 
83 Gouvernement Général d’Algérie, La Colonisation en Algérie, 21, my translation. 
84 Gouvernement Général d’Algérie, La Colonisation en Algérie, 21, my translation. 
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Frenchmen to work the land or even to buy it rendered the policy a failure. Much of the territory 
was sold, but the majority of it ended up back in the hands of the incapable (in French eyes) 
people of Algeria, who, without guidance from the French, would continue to waste its potential. 
Thus, the French government tied the issue of colonization and increasing the French population 
in Algeria directly to the Algerian soil. It was the land that the French government was most 
concerned with, and the land that would eventually be considered so important that it became a 
part of France, not a mere colony. 
 Though colonization was a major goal of the French government from the 1860s, there 
was already a small settler population in Algeria. According to a governmental report, in the 
decade from 1861 to 1870, this population increased by 25%. However, “the agricultural 
population lost 1%” in the same period.89 This discrepancy further disappointed officials who 
privileged above all the cultivation of Algeria. The settler population, though small, was already 
beginning to develop its own unique culture. As early as 1860, Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer notes, 
even as Napoléon III’s government was attempting to entice French people to colonize Algeria, 
“a generation of settlers born in Algeria reached adulthood without having known France. They 
declared themselves, with a certain force, Algerians, even as they remained French.”90 This 
remarkable self-appellation would continue until the end of French rule in Algeria. The fact that 
the settlers were willing to adopt the term “Algerian” to refer to themselves indicates the lack of 
importance of the people of Algeria, who were referred to primarily as “Arabs” or “indigènes” 
(“native/indigenous”). In fact, the term actively marginalized the people of Algeria while 
legitimizing the settlers’ place in the colony, as scholar David Prochaska argues: “Thus, at one 
blow the settlers proclaimed their hegemony in Algeria and at the same time obliterated the 
native Algerians in the very terms they used to describe themselves.”91 Additionally, the settlers’ 
use of the term “Algerian” suggests that although the majority of them were not farmers, they 
still felt a strong sense of attachment to the land – that is, to Algeria (Algérie), from which they 
derived the term Algerian (Algérien).  
 
The Need for Colonization: The 1870s 
In the 1870s, the French government was still unsure of their approach to Algeria. The 
failure of the land sale policies of the 1860s to either increase the cultivation of Algeria or 
encourage French people to move there left officials with few options. In fact, many French 
officials were still not convinced that Algeria needed to be colonized. Those who supported 
colonization were forced to create new strategies to increase the French population in Algeria, 
since the sale of land had been unsuccessful. As such, officials encountered problems both in 
enticing French people to move to Algeria and in convincing their fellow politicians that such 
projects merited their attention.  
For those French politicians who supported colonizing Algeria, the early 1870s proved 
providential. In 1871, France ceded the territory of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, following its 
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defeat in the Franco-German War. Many residents of this territory emigrated to France, 
unwilling to remain under German rule.92 Seizing this opportunity, the French government 
offered Algerian land, free of charge, to any Alsatians “who choose French citizenship and will 
commit themselves to going to Algeria.” By an October 1871 decree, “the settlers must commit 
to cultivating, to putting to use and to inhabiting their concession; the failure to execute these 
obligations can lead to forfeiture [of their concession].”93 Colonization was again tied intimately 
to the Algerian land: Alsatian settlers were required to farm the soil or risk losing it. By 1874, 
this system had brought 877 Alsatian families to Algeria. However, the French government 
reported that the majority of these settlers, “bereft of resources and formerly city-dwellers or 
fabric workers, ignorant of working the land; disoriented and suffering from a climate they were 
not used to, failed…”94 Thus, though land had become the primary motivation for colonization, 
French officials again ignored the experience of the French in Algeria. Some French politicians 
had come to accept the insistence of Randon and others that the Algerian land was valuable; 
however, they continued to ignore settler experiences of the harshness of the Algerian climate, a 
fact that had been reported upon decades earlier by the military. 
In the interests of colonization, the French government opened the concessions to other 
French citizens, not solely Alsatians. The October decree also instituted a broader “system of 
concessions applicable to all French of European origin.”95 Under this system, the settler 
received a lease with an obligation of nine years of residence. If, after this period, he had met his 
obligations, the lease would become a title to the land.96 This strategy was in response to the 
failure of the land sale policies of the 1860s: instead of trying to sell the land, the French 
government turned to a system of free concessions, with the obligation of cultivation. This 
approach further emphasized the perceived importance of the land: the government was willing 
to give it away, so long as it would be put to use. 
This emphasis on bringing Frenchmen to Algeria was a product of the continued belief in 
the inferiority of the people of Algeria. In 1879, an unofficial parliamentary excursion visited the 
colony to “search for all that which can be favorable to the development of Algeria.”97 Journalist 
Paul Bourde’s book about the trip both emphasized the potential of the Algerian land and 
demonstrated that there were still many French politicians who were against the colonization of 
Algeria. Bourde spent a great deal of time (an entire chapter, in addition to various mentions 
throughout) discussing the agriculture of Algeria, including reflections on specific crops: “In the 
past the production of [olive] oil was left in the hands of the indigènes, who obtained only 
products that could not be sold.”98  His descriptions underlined the richness and great potential of 
the soil, but demonstrated clearly that working it could not be “left” to the people of Algeria, 
who did not know how to use it effectively. Similarly, Bourde asserted that the farms of French 
                                                 
92 "Alsace-Lorraine," Encyclopædia Britannica, last modified Feb. 17, 2016, 
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95 Gouvernement Général d’Algérie, La Colonisation en Algérie, 25, my translation. 
96 Gouvernement Général d’Algérie, La Colonisation en Algérie, 25. 
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settlers in the colony “show what European activity will make of [Algeria]…Look at this farm 
and look at the miserable encampments of the [people of Algeria] that are established in the 
surrounding areas.”99 For Bourde, European knowledge was required to “make” something of 
Algeria, because the people of Algeria lacked the intelligence or the skills to cultivate it properly. 
He emphasized the necessity of French colonization, and again tied it to the cultivation of the 
land. In an orientalist manner, Bourde underlined the inferiority of the people of Algeria, who 
were perceived as incapable of effectively using their resources. However, he also highlighted 
the great potential value of the soil itself. 
Bourde’s account of the excursion also demonstrated that there was still a division among 
French officials and French residents of Algeria. He lamented, “When I think that there is still in 
France a political faction that would like to leave the country to the Arabs! ...Would they 
condemn the most fertile of countries to eternal sterility?”100 Thus, Bourde simultaneously 
asserted the importance and value of Algeria as an agricultural producer as well as the stupidity 
and inferiority of the people of Algeria, in whose hands the potentially fertile and profitable land 
would be left sterile and worthless. In his condemnation of those who would “leave the country 
to the Arabs,” Bourde also emphasized the split between French officials in France and those in 
Algeria. Despite the land concession and sale policies, Bourde’s concerns demonstrated that 
many French politicians still did not consider colonization a major issue. Though he had been in 
Algeria for little more than a month, Bourde recognized its potential value and called for 
colonization, while many French officials who had never left France continued to ignore the 
colony. 
 Bourde’s work further underlined the different views of French officials in France and in 
Algeria by directly contradicting images of the colony presented by other politicians. Describing 
a prospector he encountered, Bourde reflected, “This madness of the search for treasures is fairly 
common in Algeria, where many different conquerors [throughout history] have left legends of 
buried treasures.”101 Even Napoléon III had spoken of “taking from the land all the treasures that 
Providence buried there.”102 According to Bourde, however, such treasures were nothing but a 
legend, even “madness;” the sole “treasure” of the land was its agricultural potential, which 
could only be realized through the work of French settlers. In dismissing the prospectors’ 
"madness," Bourde also dismissed the views of French officials, including the Emperor, that the 
Algerian land might contain mineable resources. Thus, he further emphasized the division 
between French politicians and those who had first-hand experience of Algeria.  
 Though Bourde’s book purported to be merely an account of the excursion, it was filled 
with statements on the potential value and importance of the colony. In fact, in many instances, it 
was more an argument in favor of colonization than a descriptive work. Even the introduction 
concluded with the statement that the author held “the firm conviction that the destiny of France 
is very intimately concerned in its [Algeria’s] prosperity.”103 This sentiment recurred throughout 
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the book, with various laments and more subtle indications that the French did not care enough 
about Algeria. This point was emphasized once and for all in the conclusion: “In general, we 
don’t believe enough in our colony, and the settlers who know it fiercely desire to destroy this 
vexing sentiment…”104 Bourde’s use of “we” in this instance referred to the French people in 
France, who had little or no experience of the colony and tended to ignore it. Those who did 
concern themselves with Algeria, Bourde continued, relied on “[t]he judgment…that was formed 
during the first thirty years that followed the conquest.”105 Bourde’s goal was to correct these 
tendencies, to demonstrate that Algeria was not only worthy of notice by the French but also 
potentially beneficial to France. He equally sought to demonstrate that this value was intimately 
tied to the issue of colonization: Algeria was essential to French prosperity, and French 
colonization was essential to achieving this potential.  
However, Bourde went beyond merely calling for colonization; his final thoughts 
asserted that the “goal is to make of Algeria an entirely French country.”106 He recognized the 
potential for Algeria to become truly a part of France, and was an early advocate of such a 
policy. Significantly, this call came from a Frenchman with experience in Algeria, one who 
continually emphasized that most French politicians did not share his viewpoint. Thus, it is clear 
that even in the late 1870s, some in the French government were still largely ignoring the views 
of the French in Algeria. Even Bourde, who only visited the colony for a month, felt that Algeria 
was, in essence, France’s future, and deserved far more recognition and attention from French 
officials than it was receiving.  
Despite the gloomy impression given by Bourde's rather passionate calls for more official 
concern with Algeria, some measures for colonization were instituted fairly successfully in the 
1870s. In fact, the French population in Algeria increased by 65,000 people between 1871 and 
1880.107 This increase in population, however, only further problematized the divide between 
French officials and the growing settler population. The fact that primarily city-dwelling 
Alsatians might struggle to agriculturally colonize Algeria never occurred to the officials who 
created the land concession system. Thus, even as some French politicians were starting to 
acknowledge Algeria’s potential value, they continued to ignore the experiences of the settlers, 
who had not only recognized Algeria’s value long before officials, but also had a much more 
realistic view of the hardships of life there. 
 
Questioning Colonization Strategies in the 1880s 
In the early 1880s, the French government began to critically examine its policies on 
Algeria and assess their effectiveness. A petition to the Chamber of Deputies108 by E. Tiennote 
de Princey at this time raised the concern that “the number of French established after fifty years 
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in Algeria (140,000)…is insignificant.”109 There were, Tiennote de Princey lamented, far too 
many settlers from other European countries in Algeria, who could easily become the majority. 
His concern with increasing French presence in the colony touched on questions of French 
mastery of Algeria and fears of its loss. To remedy this, he suggested that the Chamber of 
Deputies modify the terms that soldiers were required to serve in the army, recommending that 
soldiers be released from the military a year early if they were willing to live for two years in 
Algeria. The French government could even, he proposed, “create military agricultural villages” 
for these men.110 Such villages would contribute not only to the settlement of Algeria, but also to 
increasing the use of the land, again emphasizing the importance of agriculture in Algeria. 
“[W]hat is necessary for Algeria,” Tiennote de Princey concluded, “are French workers, workers 
and again workers” to increase the cultivation of the Algerian soil.111 Thus, Tiennote de Princey 
believed not only that Algeria needed French settlers, but that these settlers had to be willing to 
both remain in the colony for several years (under his plan, soldiers would be obligated to live in 
Algeria for at least two years) and work in the colony, preferably by cultivating the land. As 
such, he again tied the issue of colonization to the use of the land. Significantly, Tiennote de 
Princey himself owned property in Algeria, though he was originally from western France. Thus, 
his petition represents another instance of the French government largely ignoring the 
suggestions of French settlers and Frenchmen with experience in the colony.112 
Faced with the relative failure of previous efforts to increase the French presence in 
Algeria, the French government was growing tired of spending money on Algerian colonization 
projects. At the end of 1883, the Chamber of Deputies debated and ultimately rejected a proposal 
to “place at the disposition of the Minister of the Interior a sum of 50 million francs to be used 
for the acquisition of land and in colonization efforts in Algeria.”113 The proposed funds were to 
be used to “create, in Algeria…175 new villages, 175 essentially agricultural colonization 
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centers.”114 The bill was defeated by a vote of 249 to 211.115 However, the failure of the bill did 
not reflect a lack of interest in Algeria nor a refutation of the importance of the Algerian land; on 
the contrary, many of those who spoke against the bill affirmed their support for the colonization 
of Algeria. Rather, the bill’s defeat represented a rejection of the methods that were being used in 
this effort.  
 The main issue that the deputies debated was the question of “official colonization” 
versus “independent colonization.”116 Neither of these terms was clearly defined, and various 
deputies seemed to use them in slightly different ways. However, the main difference between 
them was consistent: “independent colonization” encompassed any instance of French citizens 
choosing to move to Algeria without the active role of the French state in enticing them to do so, 
while “official colonization” included colonization strategies that had state participation. For 
example, one deputy stated that, “It is indisputable that it is by the law of 13 September 1871 
[regarding the relocation of Alsatians to Algeria] that the National Assembly marked the starting 
point, as it were, of official colonization.”117 Thus, this deputy considered “official colonization” 
to be a relatively new practice, little more than a decade old, in which the government offered 
concessions to entice settlers to Algeria. However, the governor-general of Algeria, Louis 
Tirman, asserted that, “nothing in Algeria is done except by official colonization…There is not a 
city, not a village that was formed entirely without the intervention of the State, without the State 
distributing land to the inhabitants[;] there is not a single one.”118 As such, Tirman supported the 
proposed allocation of funds, arguing that his government needed the money to acquire land to 
create new villages in Algeria. The ultimate defeat of the bill demonstrated yet again the divide 
between French legislators and French colonial administrators over the best way to govern the 
colony. 
 Tirman’s arguments in favor of the measure relied on the potential of the Algerian land 
and the ignorance of the people of Algeria. He argued, quoting an economist, that, “The 
descendants of the Moors cannot be, whatever anyone says, completely incapable of 
understanding intensive agriculture; it is a question of time, of example and of education.”119 
Therefore, Tirman emphasized the value of the people of Algeria as agricultural laborers under 
French guidance, asserting that French colonization was essential in Algeria in order to expose 
the people of Algeria to the French “example” of agriculture, allowing the French to “educate” 
the people of Algeria in cultivation and thus increase the profitability of the colony. As such, 
Tirman’s support of the bill emphasized above all the value of the Algerian soil, and the need to 
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have French farmers both cultivating it and setting an example for the people of Algeria so that 
they could use the land to its fullest potential.  
 Those who opposed the bill were not against colonization per se, but rather against this 
particular piece of legislation. For example, Deputy Ballue,120 who opposed the measure, stated, 
“I am perfectly convinced that it is in the interest of France to pursue with a constant concern the 
development of our admirable colony. I am convinced that all the efforts that we undertake to 
develop the prosperity of Algeria will succeed in the manner most beneficial for the metropole 
itself.”121 He was not concerned about the necessity of colonizing Algeria, but rather the methods 
that were being used to do so, which he argued were ineffective. Significantly, he asserted that 
the “prosperity of Algeria” would directly benefit France, and indeed supported the development 
of Algeria because it was “in the interest of France.” Thus, by the 1880s, even those who did not 
support official colonization efforts, due to their past failures, had finally acknowledged the 
importance of Algeria to France and the necessity of doing something to encourage its 
development. Bourde’s condemnation of those in the French government who would “leave the 
country to the Arabs” was by 1883 less relevant, replaced by debates on what methods would be 
best suited to encouraging the development of Algeria, rather than whether or not it should be 
colonized in the first place.122  
 Those who supported official colonization relied on the now well-established distinction 
between the value of the Algerian land and its people. Deputy Georges Graux,123 who was in 
favor of the authorization of 50 million francs for the colonization of Algeria, argued that, “if one 
wants to wait for colonists to come settle individually in Algeria, one will perpetuate the infancy 
of indigène agriculture.”124 He asserted that without official colonization, no Frenchmen would 
settle in Algeria of their own accord, and thus the potential of the land would not be realized due 
to the “infancy” of the agricultural methods of the people of Algeria. Georges Graux further 
contended, quoting the economist Michel Chevalier, that, “What is required, to make Algeria a 
French land, a possession that benefits France, that adds to its grandeur, to the force of its 
industry and to its military power, is a strong European population.”125 This argument privileged 
the potential of Algeria, not only agriculturally but also industrially, while also marginalizing the 
people of Algeria by asserting that the colony could only reach its profitable potential through 
the creation of a “European population” in the colony. Thus, in arguing for official colonization, 
politicians like Georges Graux relied on the discursive distinction between the potential of 
Algeria and the inferiority of the people of Algeria. 
 Arguments against “official colonization” also focused on the use of the land and the 
necessity of having French settlers cultivating it, in the same way that arguments supporting the 
bill did. Much official colonization up to that point had relied on the expropriation of land from 
the people of Algeria in order to build towns. However, many, including Ballue, felt that this 
system was ineffective. Ballue suggested instead that, “Before wanting to implant in Algeria a 
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more considerable population…begin by augmenting the productivity of the soil…you will 
augment the wealth of the indigènes, and, without even employing expropriations, by an 
agreement with them, you will be able to ask them to cede their land to you.”126 He argued that 
by taking such measures as diverting rivers to improve irrigation, the French could increase the 
productivity, and thus the value, of land belonging to the people of Algeria. Because their land 
would be more productive, he reasoned, they would need less and thus be more willing to cede it 
to the French, who would then acquire more valuable territory than they would have with a 
policy of expropriation, in addition to pacifying the people of Algeria and preventing them from 
resenting the French for seizing their property. Significantly, though his plan was in opposition 
to French policy up to that point, it relied on the principle of maximizing the value of the land 
and obtaining soil for cultivation by French settlers as the basis of colonization. Thus, the 
importance of the land and its integral role in colonization were widely accepted in the French 
parliament by the early 1880s. 
 Another deputy who was against the project, Deputy Guichard,127 expressed the idea of 
Algeria that would eventually become the official policy; that is, the image of Algeria as part of 
France. Guichard began by commenting that “our dearest desire is that [Algeria] ceases to be a 
source of diversion that weakens France, and that, in the closest possible future, it becomes for 
us an auxiliary force that augments the power of the country.”128 Guichard too tied the 
development of Algeria to the prosperity of France, as well as acknowledging the past divisions 
over Algerian policy and the lack of attention paid to the colony, which, he asserted, actually 
“weakened” France. However, Guichard went beyond such links between Algerian settlement 
and French prosperity to anticipate the eventual place of Algeria in the French imaginary: “I 
believe that Algeria does not have to be solely a possession from which France draws more or 
less direct profit; I believe that it must be a new France…”129 Thus, as early as 1883, Algeria was 
beginning to be considered more than just a colony by members of the French government, who 
could see the potential to create a “new France.” Though they disagreed on the best methods for 
achieving this goal, the deputies concurred that the colonization through cultivation of Algeria 
was essential to the prosperity of both the colony and the metropole. 
 Officials’ lack of consensus on the best approach to the management of Algeria resulted 
in inconsistent policies on the colony, despite the agreement on the value of its land. This was in 
contrast to agricultural policies in other European colonies. In Kenya, for example, the colonial 
administration established a plantation economy that increased the agricultural exploitation of 
the colony and also placed settlers in the role of managers rather than farmers. With this goal, 
economist Richard Wolff observes, “officials developed a complex set of laws and institutions 
which forced the vast majority of African males between the ages of fifteen and forty to seek 
work on European plantations.”130 In addition to the creation of the plantation system, 
administrators also restricted Kenyans to specific territories whose conditions did not allow them 
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to enter into competition with settler farms.131 As such, the British administration in Kenya 
succeeded in building a system in which the Kenyans were functionally forced to become 
agricultural laborers who would make the land profitable for Britain. In French Algeria, 
however, such a system was never instituted, despite the recognition of the value and potential of 
the soil. This failure to take concrete action on Algeria was due to the government’s continued 
division over Algeria and officials’ lack of recognition of the needs and opinions of the French 
settlers in the colony. 
 
Calls for a French Algeria: The 1890s 
In the early 1890s, the issue of Algeria was addressed directly by the French Senate. As 
part of an 1892 inquiry into the state of affairs in Algeria, Émilien Chatrieux wrote, and 
subsequently published, a 350-page volume detailing and critiquing the history of French actions 
in Algeria and providing suggestions for future policies. The preface noted that while other 
works contributed to the inquest were “hasty” in their production, “M. [Monsieur] Chatrieux 
adds a serious book, full of facts and precise documents...”132 This work represented the official 
French governmental view at the end of the nineteenth century, and reflected both the 
importance of the Algerian land and the lack of value of the people of Algeria, as well as 
expressing concern about the continued lack of French understanding of the colony. As such, it 
represented the prevailing turn of the century view, as expressed by an author who had lived for 
a substantial period in Algeria and was thus quite knowledgeable about the colony, as well as 
being familiar with the French bureaucracy.133 
 Chatrieux began his work by emphasizing how little most Frenchmen knew about 
Algeria. Even the writer of the preface, the Deputy of Algiers at the time, highlighted that “[t]his 
book is not the work of a theoretician; it was not created in the silence of the cabinet, far from 
the country of which it speaks: it is the result of the everyday experience of men and matters of 
Algeria, the observation of day-to-day life.”134 This fact not only set it apart from other works on 
the colony, but also gave it more legitimacy in the eyes of the Deputy, demonstrating the 
continued divide between French politicians and Frenchmen in Algeria. Chatrieux himself stated 
in his Notice to the Reader that he “was struck by the considerable number of inexactitudes” in 
the contemporary literature on Algeria.135 In fact, he asserted that “Algeria is not sufficiently 
known by the mother country, who seems too often to be ignorant [of Algerian matters].”136 As 
such, Chatrieux declared his intention to “summarize…succinct[ly] and faithful[ly]…the actual 
state of Algeria,” which would “be useful to French readers, who desire to quickly form a 
complete idea of what Algeria is today and what she could become…”137 Chatrieux believed not 
                                                 
131 Wolff, “Economic Aspects of British Colonialism in Kenya," 277. 
132 Émilien Chatrieux, Études algériennes. Contribution à l'enquête sénatoriale de 1892 [Algerian Studies. 
Contribution to the Senatorial Inquiry of 1892] (Paris: Augustin Challamel, editor, 1893), PDF, Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France (ark:/12148/bpt6k1660581), vi, my translation. 
133 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, ix-x. 
134 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, vi, my translation. 
135 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, ix, my translation. 
136 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, ix, my translation. 
137 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, ix-x, my translation. 
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only that the French had an inaccurate idea of Algeria, but also that they lacked an understanding 
of its potential. His account of Algeria, with the aim of correcting the misconceptions about the 
colony, sought to remedy the decades-old division between French officials in Algeria and those 
in the metropole. 
 Chatrieux’s work concentrated on the value of the Algerian land while also affirming the 
inferiority of its people. The chapter on colonization began, “Algeria is an essentially agricultural 
land. Its richness is entirely in the soil.”138 This statement demonstrated not only the philosophy 
behind colonization policies in the 1870s, but also Chatrieux’s belief in the importance of the 
Algerian land. Though the colony had experienced famines in the past, these were due, Chatrieux 
asserted, to the “negligence” or “lack of foresight” of the people of Algeria.139 In fact, he 
continued, “only the European, with his civilization, knows how to subject the soil to the 
intensive cultivation that will return one hundred percent [of its potential].”140 Thus, Chatrieux 
demonstrated yet again the French belief in the value of the Algerian soil and tied the issue of 
colonization to it by emphasizing the lack of agricultural competence of the people of Algeria.  
 In reviewing past colonization policies, Chatrieux was complementary of the French 
government’s recognition of the potential value of the Algerian land: “We have understood,… 
that the future of North Africa had to be rooted in the progressive acquisition of land for the 
European settlers, [who] bring with them their scientific methods and their sophisticated 
equipment.”141 However, despite this recognition, many colonization policies failed to 
significantly increase the cultivation of Algeria. Chatrieux blamed this failure largely on what he 
perceived as French leniency in allowing the people of Algeria to keep their own land or even to 
buy land, labelling it “imprudent generosity…[that] always weighed heavily on the colony.”142 
This “generosity” prevented France from using the Algerian land to its full potential by allowing 
the people of Algeria to continue cultivating it ineffectively.  
 Though he acknowledged that the government recognized the value of the Algerian land, 
Chatrieux ultimately argued that the French government needed more clearly-defined policies on 
Algeria. He asserted that “[w]hat our successive governments have lacked is: 1) From the 
beginning, a clear awareness of what they wanted to do [in Algeria]… 2) As a consequence, a 
clearly conceived management plan, followed with perseverance, if needed with obstinacy.”143 
This lack of a clear objective for Algeria led to management of the colony by a “central 
government [that was] hesitant and indecisive.”144 This “central government” was not the 
colonial administration of Algeria but the French government, which Chatrieux criticized for its 
lack of interest in Algeria and its ignorance of the colony and its potential value. Ultimately, 
Chatrieux concluded, the Senate was at a crucial juncture: “We want to remain in Algeria. Well 
then, the question is…if we want to remain there as masters, or as foreigners tolerated by the 
                                                 
138 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, 43, my translation. 
139 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, 43, my translation. Original “imprévoyance” can be translated as either 
negligence or lack of foresight, in addition to carelessness, inattentiveness, or dereliction, i.e. of duty. While “lack of 
foresight” seems most relevant in this context, any or all of these translations could also apply. 
140 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, 44, my translation. 
141 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, 46, my translation. 
142 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, 47, my translation. 
143 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, 297-298, my translation. 
144 Chatrieux, Études algériennes, 298, my translation. 
25
Gulley: French Land, Algerian People
Published by Chapman University Digital Commons, 2018
  
conquered populations.”145 Up to this point, Chatrieux suggested, the French had been the latter; 
they had not taken full possession of Algeria, nor had they realized its potential. Chatrieux felt 
strongly that the French needed to be more assertive and decisive in the colony, and his 
suggestions to this effect became the governmental policy on Algeria.  
Chatrieux’s report not only concluded that the French needed to be more assertive in 
Algeria but also that they needed to focus more on its Frenchness. His work argued that “[i]n 
Algeria, it is necessary to carry out French policies. That is the lesson of history.”146  
Furthermore, he asserted, “[w]e have tried time and again to create an Algeria for the Arabs. 
Events have always cruelly demonstrated that this was nothing but a dangerous illusion. Because 
we conquered Algeria, we must make it a colony that is for neither the Arabs, nor the foreigners, 
nor the Jews; but for the French.”147 This was the culmination of several decades of distinction 
between Algeria and its people. Not only should France carry out French policies in Algeria, 
confirming its place as a part of France; these French policies must be carried out for the French, 
who were clearly distinguished from the primarily Muslim (“Arab”) people of Algeria. In other 
words, the report suggested that French official policy largely ignore the people of Algeria and 
instead focus on the French and on policies that could make Algeria truly a part of France, while 
denying this status to the people of Algeria. 
 When Chatrieux’s work did recognize the people of Algeria, it was only to highlight and 
codify their inferiority. It asserted that decades of policies encouraging the people of Algeria to 
become more like the French had had little effect, and as such, the French should “resign 
ourselves to treating them as subjects.”148 This argument finally institutionalized the view of the 
inferiority of the people of Algeria by suggesting that they officially become mere subjects of 
France, not worthy of equal citizenship. Hence by 1913, there was a distinction between the 
people of Algeria and the Europeans living in Algeria, in that the people of Algeria lacked rights 
tied to citizenship. After almost a half-century of viewing (and discussing) the people of Algeria 
as inferior, these beliefs became the official French policy in the colony. Significantly, this 
occurred at the same time that the government began to consider using truly French policies in 
Algeria, no longer adapting them for use in the colony but merely transplanting them from 
France to Algeria. As such, the official subjugation of the people of Algeria occurred at the same 
time that the government began to treat Algeria as an extension of France, not a mere colony. In 
this way, the legitimation of Algeria, the land and its value, as undeniably French, was tied to the 
policy of effectively disregarding the people of Algeria. 
Chatrieux’s recommendation that the French employ French policies in Algeria counters 
the widely accepted narrative of French colonial policies at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Many scholars recognize this time as the transition from a policy of “assimilation” to one of 
“association.” 149 In his study of French empire, for example, Robert Aldrich asserts that 
“‘assimilation’ had suggested that, in theory, the colonies (and the colonized) could potentially 
be treated just as the metropole; …natives, with suitable acculturation, could become fully-
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fledged Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, and the French political system could simply be 
transported overseas.” However, Aldrich continues, “around the turn of the century, ‘association’ 
replaced ‘assimilation’ in the policy handbooks: …colonies might need to be ruled differently 
from the metropole and from each other, accession to French rights (and Frenchness) was 
unlikely for many and would require a long initiation: the colonies did not just form a 
geographical extension of the metropole.”150 Though Aldrich’s analysis of the treatment of the 
people of Algeria is consistent with Chatrieux’s work, his description of French governance 
contrasts with Chatrieux’s emphasis on French policies in Algeria. While Aldrich describes a 
trend in which the French initially recognized the colonies as French and later began to 
differentiate them with different policies, Chatrieux’s work and the various management 
strategies throughout the nineteenth century suggest that in Algeria, this was not the case. On the 
contrary, it was only at the turn of the twentieth century that the French government recognized 
Algeria as part of France and began to use French policies there. Thus, even as other colonies 
were deemed in need of specialized governance, Algeria was defined as part of France and 
therefore in need of French policies. 
 However, even as the French government declared Algeria to be officially a part of 
France, the settlers in Algeria were creating a new, distinctly Algerian identity for themselves. 
As scholar Lizabeth Zack argues, “By 1902, ‘Algerian’ political identity was deeply embedded 
in the settler political culture of Algiers, and clearly distinct from ‘French’ political identity.”151 
This Algerian identity was shared by a group of settlers from various parts of Europe, not only 
France. These settlers, according to historian David Prochaska, were a mix of “native and 
naturalized French…Spanish, Italians, and Maltese” who were creating a new “collective 
identity” in Algeria.152 Indeed, in 1921, there were nearly 200,000 “foreigners” living in the 
colony, according to the General Government of Algeria.153 Interestingly, as Prochaska notes, 
“[n]ot only did the various Europeans refer to themselves as ‘Algerians’ [as noted above], but 
they created their own language, or rather dialect.” This dialect, known as pataouète, “reflects 
the disparate backgrounds and demographic characteristics of the European settlers, and at the 
same time expresses the experience of the nascent pied noir community.”154 The creation of this 
dialect, which included words from the various languages spoken by the European settlers, 
strengthened the Algerian identity. Indeed, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
Algerian political identity was a distinct imagined community.155 This community included 
literature in its unique dialect; both newspapers and books were published in pataouète as early 
as 1898.156 The creation of literature in pataouète is significant in that it indicates the strength of 
the Algerian community, as well as clearly defining it as separate from both the French and the 
people of Algeria by excluding both groups linguistically. Printed commodities also lead to 
codification of language, standardizing it and creating definite rules of usage that distinguish it 
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from other languages.157 As such, the Algerian identity was not merely a loose amalgamation of 
various foreigners but a well-defined, distinctive community whose members had more in 
common with one another than with their countries of origin. 
It is ironic that as the French government made Algeria officially French, the settlers of 
Algeria separated themselves from the French by creating their own Algerian identity. Even as 
the French were beginning to integrate Algeria into their conception of France, the settler 
community was clearly distinguishing itself from its French and/or European origins. This 
indicates the constant ignorance on the part of the French government of the views and opinions 
of the French in Algeria. The continued failure of the French government to recognize both 
Algeria’s potential value and the difficulty of life there, despite such recognition from the French 
there, necessitated the creation of an Algerian identity, which would be in opposition to a 
government that finally acknowledged Algeria as an integral part of France. In fact, it is possible 
that the creation of this Algerian identity was a factor in the institution of French policies in 
Algeria. Chatrieux’s work asserted that Algeria was “for neither the Arabs, nor the foreigners, 
nor the Jews; but for the French.”158 In including this reference to “foreigners,” Chatrieux 
indirectly expressed the concern that there was too much influence from other Europeans in 
Algeria, as well as the desire to ensure that it remained undeniably French. Having lived in 
Algeria himself, it is likely that Chatrieux was aware of the formation of the Algerian identity as 
separate from French identity, and thus likely that this was one factor in his recommendation that 
the French pay more attention to Algeria and institute French policies there. However, it is also 
apparent that his main concern was the cultivation of Algeria, as this statement is one of only a 
few where he directly mentions “foreigners” in a negative light. Thus, the French conception of 
Algeria as French, though perhaps influenced by the creation of a colonial identity, was rooted 
mainly in the perceived value of the Algerian land. Indeed, the decision to use French policies in 
Algeria came at the same time that the Algerian political identity was definitively forming. The 
two processes were parallel to one another, both rooted in France’s lack of unity on Algeria 
throughout the nineteenth century, as well as its belief in the value of the Algerian land and the 
lack of value of the people of Algeria. 
 
Long-Term Consequences: The War of Independence 
Ultimately, the distinction between the land and the people of Algeria played an 
important role in the Algerian War of Independence. In response to the beginning of the rebellion 
in 1954, Pierre Mendès-France, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated, “The departments of 
Algeria constitute a part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time and in 
an irrevocable manner…Between them and the metropole there is no conceivable secession.”159 
Thus, the view of Algeria as truly a part of France persisted until the 1950s. Mendès-France 
spoke of a “secession,” suggesting that a war between France and Algeria would be a civil war, 
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not a war of independence. With this view of Algeria, the French government was not inclined to 
accept the demands of the National Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale, FLN) for 
Algerian independence, in large part due to Algeria’s place in the French imaginary. 
Algeria was French soil, but the inhabitants of Algeria remained different in the eyes of 
the French people. Nearly ten years before the beginning of the war, in 1945, there was a smaller 
revolt in Sétif, which prompted the French government to make minor changes to satisfy the 
revolutionaries. The most important reform, in 1947, created an “elected Assemblée Algérienne 
[Algerian Assembly] composed of 120 members...with powers to modify metropolitan laws 
applicable to Algeria...[however,] the European minority were balanced against the entire 
Muslim population [in the Assemblée].”160 During a debate in the Algerian Assembly, one 
delegate stated, “If you consider the Muslim Algerians as French, give them all the rights of the 
French!”161 Clearly, the people of Algeria were still not considered French, and still lacked 
French citizenship rights, though Algeria was by this time considered to be part of France. This 
continued lack of rights, as well as its disparity with an Algeria considered to be “a part of the 
French Republic,” was one of the major points of contention between the FLN and the French 
government. 
In 1955, just after the official beginning of the War of Independence, the French 
government instituted a policy of “collective responsibility” in regards to revolutionaries. When 
an act of terrorism was committed against the French, authorities arrested all the male people of 
Algeria in the area and sent them to internment camps.162 It did not matter to the French whether 
those rounded up were guilty or not; they were arrested solely for being people of Algeria. This 
policy emphasized that the French did not accord any importance to the people of Algeria, even 
as they fought them (again) for possession of Algeria. The injustice of this policy inspired many 
of the people of Algeria to join the FLN: “[B]y May [1955, the FLN] had been reduced to two 
hundred men...Yet -- as a direct consequence of ‘collective responsibility’ -- by August they had 
risen again to five hundred...”163 The indifference of the French to the people of Algeria, and 
their willingness to arrest innocent people simply for being people of Algeria, aided the FLN. As 
such, “collective responsibility,” which continued more than a century of orientalist views of the 
people of Algeria, made the war more difficult for the French by enlarging their opposition. 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, Algeria was inhabited by around 500,000 
Europeans and 4 million people of Algeria, while France itself had a population of close to 40 
million.164  Despite this disparity in population, Algeria was widely understood to constitute an 
integral part of France, a view that persisted until the Algerian War of Independence in the 
1950s. This view of Algeria was problematized during the war, creating a difference in its 
definition: for the FLN, it was a struggle for independence, but the French fought a civil war, 
even if it was against people who were less than citizens, and therefore had less value. This 
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ultimate discursive difference was the result of more than a century of differentiation between 
the people and the land of Algeria.  
 
Conclusion 
Though an oriental view of the colonized is common in colonial relationships, the 
privileged place that Algeria held in the French imaginary as an extension of France itself is 
quite unusual. The French view of Algeria, though comparable to other colonial situations, 
nevertheless remains remarkable. The British, for example, valorized their West African colonies 
for their “agricultural wealth”165 and believed that “it is not necessary to turn up the earth more 
than two or three inches, with a light hoe, in order to cultivate any kind of grain.”166 However, 
there was no equivalent view of these colonies as forming a part of Britain; they were part of the 
British Empire, not the nation itself. In Portuguese Mozambique, on the other hand, the 
government used the slogan “Aqui é Portugal” to entice Portuguese settlers and tourists to the 
colony in the 1950s and 1960s.167 In this case, the rhetoric of Mozambique as part of Portugal 
was a conscious public relations effort designed to increase Portuguese presence in the (major 
cities of) the colony. In French Algeria, however, the government did not consistently recognize 
Algeria as part of France until the turn of the twentieth century, after the settler population had 
already established itself and following governmental attempts at colonization. Though efforts at 
official colonization throughout the late nineteenth century focused on the Algerian soil and its 
potential, it did not speak of the land as being part of France. Thus, though French colonial 
discourse on Algeria shared some similarities with other European colonial rhetoric, it remained 
distinct in its implications. 
In examining the nineteenth-century government discourse on Algeria, it becomes clear 
that the understanding of Algeria as part of France had its roots in both the colonial and 
governmental discourse on Algeria in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the policies it 
engendered. Throughout France’s initial half-century in Algeria, French soldiers, settlers, and 
finally politicians consistently created a discursive distinction between Algeria and its people. 
This distinction influenced policies such as attempting to tie the people of Algeria to their land. 
However, despite such policies, the French government often ignored the experiences of French 
settlers and soldiers in Algeria, consistently failing to recognize both soldiers’ and settlers’ 
suffering, as well as the land’s potential. Ultimately, just before the turn of the twentieth century, 
the French government began to view Algeria differently, as a place in need of French policies, 
not Algerian or colonial ones, even as settlers in Algeria ceased defining themselves as French. 
The distinction between the land and its people was an important factor in Algerian policies up to 
the turn of the twentieth century, heavily influencing the government’s perception of Algeria and 
thus its management of the colony, which failed to take into account the Algerian perspective. 
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